NEWMAN'S "GENTLEMAN"

Edited By

CHARLES L. O'DONNELL, C.S.C.

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BY

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FOREWORD

A PURPOSE other than academic gave the first impulse to the issue of this Lecture in separate form. Newman's idea of a gentleman has been widely and seriously misunderstood. To prove this it was seen to be necessary to set forth the entire text of the Discourse in which that idea is developed; as the part can be rightly understood only in its relation to the whole. When this was done, it seemed good, also, to establish the right concept before the wrong could get a footing, and the place to do this is the class room.

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME,
DECEMBER, 1915.

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TEACHERS' INTRODUCTION

The average instructor is, perhaps, inclined to regard "hints," "helps," "points," addressed to himself as something of an affront. And back of his feeling there is some reason. A teacher who stood in actual need of such ought not to be a teacher. Accordingly, at the outset it is here conceded that the instructor may present *Newman's "Gentleman"* after his own mind, and the editor will be brief in his *apologia pro cursu suo.*

His aim is, first, to insure assimilation of the author's thought and, secondly, to secure recognition of his style. This aim is twofold in intention only, as the object itself is really one. As Newman says: "Thought and speech are inseparable from each other. Matter and expression are parts of one: style is a thinking out into language."* To think is to express; it is only in terms of speech that we can think, or if not in terms of actual speech, then under other symbols standing therefor, as may be the case with very young children. Thoughts are not to be confused with feelings; the latter cannot always be put into words, but thoughts really begin to exist only when they are mentally worded. The frequent saying, "If I could only express what is in my mind," is thus—unless the speaker is in reality referring to emotions—but a convenient

* *Idea of a University*, p. 276. Longmans, Green, and Co.

cover for mental blankness. When we have thoughts we have thoughts in words. Once this principle is grasped, we have a sound method of approach for the study of style in the classics. It is particularly important for the study of a writer like Newman, between whose thought and its expression there is usually a perfect coequation.

This view of style has a further usefulness when the reader turns writer. The sources of a student's deficiencies in writing are two—in thought, and in forethought. The chief deficiency, often, is the absence of both. All the faults of vagueness and weakness; of inertia that shows itself in unrelieved verbal repetitions and a certain innocent unconcern about the precise meaning of words; rhetorical and even grammatical errors, these all are chargeable to defective mental processes. The student "knows better," but does not *think*. The greatest real fault of all, however, comes from lack of forethought: that fault is defective structure. This is the precise difficulty of those students who have what is known as a turn for writing. They are not superficial, as is so often alleged, they are but precipitate. They stand not on the order of their writing, but write. They begin their thinking and their writing at the same moment. Seldom, even among writers of whatever academic standing, will such work have plan, balance, proportion, in a word, structure.

Now Newman is always structural. He has a philosophy to expound, principles to explain, points to make. He foresees the scope and development of his thought, and preordains its treatment. Precisely because this

dominant character of his work has been overlooked has there grown up a false impression regarding his idea of a gentleman. That idea is here presented in its context in the only possible light in which it can be understood. To make Newman's mind plain upon this point should have, solely from the scholastic point of view, at least three precious results for the student: first, the assimilation of a body of valuable thought; secondly, an expansion of his thinking power, and, thirdly, a lesson of style, particularly along that line which most needs emphasis, namely, structure.

A word about the presentation of the text. The general introduction should be studied in connection with Newman's argument. No notes of mere information are furnished. Let the student, and not the editor or teacher, have the advantage of consulting dictionaries and works of reference. Insist that this advantage be seized. The editor's notes keep in mind his aim as previously stated—assimilation of thought and recognition of style, especially under the aspect of structure.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

In a recently published biography there occurs this statement: " It is easy to recognize in the Bishop what Cardinal Newman is pleased to style his idea of a true gentleman—'one who never needlessly inflicts pain.' "* This statement is substantially true and, moreover, it has a fuller substantial truth than the biographer could have intended. A happier instance of Newman's gentleman than Bishop Curtis there could not be; but the writer has not stated, and apparently does not know Newman's idea of a gentleman, or, better, Newman's ideal gentleman.

This biographer does not err alone. Newman's remark—it is no more than that—has become a commonplace of quotation. In miscellaneous reading one meets it almost daily. Nor is this all. There are before the editor three books of selections from the works of Cardinal Newman and a fourth book of general selections, in all of which Newman's description of the gentleman is given. Of these four volumes, all intended for academic purpose and, as a fact, widely used, only one presents Newman's true mind on this subject. Not only that; in the other three, just the opposite of what the great writer meant to convey is all that can

* *Right Reverend Alfred Curtis, D. D.: A Biography*, p. 113.

be gathered from the selection as given. Let it be said at once that this misrepresentation, blameworthy as it is in itself, would seem to be, on the part of the editors, altogether indeliberate. Every effort is made, on all sides, to represent the master fairly; there are introductions, references, notes, bibliographies, helps to study, and all the rest. But the one thing necessary is omitted. That one thing is the entire discourse. The fault committed in presenting this particular part of the Cardinal's philosophy is the very elementary one of the divorce of text from context. Here have the quotation-makers and the well-intentioned editors stumbled; and as their error may beget a wrong tradition, it is well that the matter be set right.

Newman describes the gentleman in *The Idea of a University*, Discourse VIII., "Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Religion," pp. 179–211. The proper context of the matter in question, then, is at least the whole of Discourse VIII., and with it a summary of the three preceding discourses would not be amiss. The treatment of knowledge in relation to religious duty is really the close-linked conclusion to a series of discourses looking to the affiliations of knowledge. (Discourses V., VI., VII. and VIII.) Thus, in an introductory section of this particular Discourse, the author recapitulates the points already established and states what is yet left to be considered. He has shown: that Knowledge is its own reward (V), that Philosophy should be the informing spirit of Knowledge (VI), and that because liberal Knowledge has "intrinsic excellence" it results in exterior advantages (VII). It re-

mains for him to exhibit the general bearings of Knowledge upon Religion as it affects conduct: What helps or hindrances, with respect to religious duty, does Knowledge afford, or, limiting the inquiry to practical issue, does Knowledge make a man morally good? This is the precise problem of Discourse VIII.

Stated thus plainly, the question becomes, on the face of it, easy of answer. Knowledge of itself does not make a man morally good; but it may work to that end, or, again, it may effectively hinder moral progress. Throughout the Discourse the terms, " knowledge," " philosophy," " reason," " intellectual culture," " the religion of civilization," " philosophical morality," are used synonymously, or, rather, as denoting only slightly differing aspects of the one whole concept which may be termed " Culture." Against this in sharp contrast, Newman sets " Revelation," " Christianity," " Catholicism," " the Church." This opposition of ideas is so insisted upon throughout the lecture that misunderstanding of Newman's mind is impossible when the whole discourse is considered. The importance of taking into account the whole rather than a mere part of Newman's treatment of this subject is further emphasized by the following passage from the fifth discourse of this series. He writes:

" Knowledge is one thing, virtue is another; good sense is not conscience, refinement is not humility, nor is largeness and justness of view faith. Philosophy, however enlightened, however profound, gives no command over the passions, no influential motives, no

vivifying principles. Liberal Education makes not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman."*

The chief purpose of the present text—to show Newman's true mind on the gentleman—is best served by the following analysis, section by section as indicated, of the discourse in which occurs the celebrated description with which we are concerned; our chief objective for the moment being to discover the relation of that passage to the discourse as a whole.

I. Introduction:
- (*a*) Summary of three preceding discourses. (Sec. 1.)
- (*b*) Statement of present problem: to determine the relation, in moral effect, between the Religion of Civilization (i.e., Culture) and Revealed Religion.
- (*c*) Summary of chief moral principles of Revelation. (Sec. 2.)

II. Body:

A. Culture ministers to Religion:
- (*a*) Substitutes intellect for sense. (Sec. 3.)
- (*b*) Supplies a check in certain temptations by affording general interests and relaxation. (Sec. 4.)

B. Principles by which Culture does this:
1. Examined in themselves they are false. (Sec. 5.)

* *Knowledge its Own End*, p. 120.

(*a*) Culture rules out motives of hope and fear.
(*b*) Makes conscience a mere moral sense or taste.
(*c*) Creates at best a specious religious æstheticism.

2. Practically illustrated.
(*a*) From example of Julian. (Sec. 6.)
(*b*) From writings of Shaftesbury. (Sec. 7.)

C. Contrasted with Christian Principles:

1. In general basis. (Sec. 8.)
(*a*) Culture has half truths, Christianity whole.
(*b*) Culture all on the surface, Christianity chiefly at the roots.

2. In particular effects. (Sec. 9.)
(*a*) Culture's humility is condescension.
(*b*) Its modesty, a disguise.
(*c*) Its pride, self-respect.
(*d*) Its ideal, the gentleman. (Sec. 10.)

III. Conclusion:

Culture may be ally, may be foe of Christianity.

With this analysis, the mind of Newman becomes plain. The gentleman is the product of culture, religious principle being left out of consideration. What is to be thought of such a character? Newman an-

swers: Engraft Christianity upon it, or let Christian principles inform it throughout, and you have possibly the ideal character; leave it to itself, it ministers rather to evil than to good. Such is the drift of this entire Discourse, and it must be taken into account if Newman is not to be misrepresented. Supporting this conclusion is a pointed passage from an earlier portion of the same work which is quoted as gratifying confirmation of the view advanced in this introduction. Newman writes:

"It is well to be a gentleman, it is well to have a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and courteous bearing in the conduct of life;—these are the connatural qualities of a large knowledge; they are the objects of a University; I am advocating, I shall illustrate and insist upon them; but still, I repeat, they are no guarantee for sanctity or even for conscientiousness, they may attach to the man of the world, to the profligate, to the heartless,—pleasant, alas, and attractive as he shows when decked out in them. Taken by themselves, they do but seem to be what they are not; they look like virtue at a distance, but they are detected by close observers, and on the long run; and hence it is that they are popularly accused of pretence and hypocrisy, not, I repeat, from their own fault, but because their professors and their admirers persist in taking them for what they are not, and are officious in arrogating for them a praise to which they have no claim. Quarry the granite rock with razors, or moor the vessel with a thread of silk; then may you hope with such keen and

delicate instruments as human knowledge and human reason to contend against those giants, the passion and the pride of man." *

Accordingly, it is a serious confusion of thought to regard Newman's description of the gentleman as an indorsement of the gentleman: his idea of the gentleman is one thing, his judgment of the gentleman quite something else.

* *Idea of a University*, pp. 120-121.

KNOWLEDGE VIEWED IN RELATION TO RELIGION

(The Idea of a University, Discourse VIII.)

QUANTULUMCUNQUE, BENE

"One main portion of intellectual education, of the labours of both school and university, is to remove the original dimness of the mind's eye; to strengthen and perfect its vision; to enable it to look out into the world right forward, steadily and truly; to give the mind clearness, accuracy, precision; to enable it to use words aright, to understand what it says, to conceive justly what it thinks about, to abstract, compare, analyze, divide, define, and reason, correctly. There is a particular science which takes these matters in hand, and it is called logic; but it is not by logic, certainly not by logic alone, that the faculty I speak of is acquired. The infant does not learn to spell and read the hues upon his retina by any scientific rule; nor does the student learn accuracy of thought by any manual or treatise. The instruction given him, of whatever kind, if it be really instruction, is mainly, or at least pre-eminently, this,—a discipline in accuracy of mind."—Newman, "Idea of a University," p. 332.

NEWMAN'S "GENTLEMAN"

DISCOURSE VIII

KNOWLEDGE VIEWED IN RELATION TO RELIGION

1.

We shall be brought, Gentlemen, to-day, to the termination of the investigation which I commenced three Discourses back, and which, I was well aware, from its length, if for no other reason, would make demands upon the patience even of indulgent hearers.

First I employed myself in establishing the principle that Knowledge is its own reward; and I showed that when considered in this light, it is called Liberal Knowledge, and is the scope of Academical Institutions.

Next, I examined what is meant by Knowledge, when it is said to be pursued for its own sake; and I showed that, in order satisfactorily to fulfil this idea, Philosophy must be its *form;* or, in other words, that its matter must not be admitted into the mind passively, as so much acquirement, but must be mastered and appropriated as a system consisting of parts,

related one to the other, and interpretative of one another in the unity of a whole.

Further, I showed that such a philosophical contemplation of the field of Knowledge as a whole, leading, as it did, to an understanding of its separate departments, and an appreciation of them respectively, might in consquence be rightly called an illumination; also, it was rightly called an enlargement of mind, because it was a distinct location of things one with another, as if in space; while it was moreover its proper cultivation and its best condition, both because it secured to the intellect the sight of things as they are, or of truth, in opposition to fancy, opinion, and theory; and again, because it presupposed and involved the perfection of its various powers.

Such, I said, was that Knowledge, which deserves to be sought for its own sake, even though it promised no ulterior advantage. But, when I had got as far as this, I went farther, and observed that, from the nature of the case, what was so good in itself could not but have a number of external uses, though it did not promise them, simply because it *was* good; and that it was necessarily the source of benefits to society, great and diversified in proportion to its own intrinsic excellence. Just as in morals, honesty is the best policy, as being profitable in a secular aspect, though such profit is not the measure of its worth, so too as regards what may be called the virtues of the Intellect, their very possession indeed is a substantial good, and is enough, yet still that substance has a shadow, inseparable from it, viz., its social and political usefulness. And this was

the subject to which I devoted the preceding Discourse.

One portion of the subject remains:—this intellectual culture, which is so exalted in itself, not only has a bearing upon social and active duties, but upon Religion also. The educated mind may be said to be in a certain sense religious; that is, it has what may be considered a religion of its own, independent of Catholicism, partly co-operating with it, partly thwarting it; at once a defence yet a disturbance to the Church in Catholic countries,—and in countries beyond her pale, at one time in open warfare with her, at another in defensive alliance. The history of schools and Academies, and of Literature and Science generally, will, I think, justify me in thus speaking. Since, then, my aim in these Discourses is to ascertain the function and the action of a University, viewed in itself, and its relations to the various instruments of teaching and training which are round about it, my survey of it would not be complete unless I attempted, as I now propose to do, to exhibit its general bearings upon Religion.

2.

Right Reason, that is, Reason rightly exercised, leads the mind to the Catholic Faith, and plants it there, and teaches it in all its religious speculations to act under its guidance. But Reason, considered as a real agent in the world, and as an operative principle in man's nature, with an historical course and with definite results, is far from taking so straight and satis-

factory a direction. It considers itself from first to last independent and supreme; it requires no external authority; it makes a religion for itself. Even though it accepts Catholicism, it does not go to sleep; it has an action and development of its own, as the passions have, or the moral sentiments, or the principle of self-interest. Divine grace, to use the language of Theology, does not by its presence supersede nature; nor is nature at once brought into simple concurrence and coalition with grace. Nature pursues its course, now coincident with that of grace, now parallel to it, now across, now divergent, now counter, in proportion to its own imperfection and to the attraction and influence which grace exerts over it. And what takes place as regards other principles of our nature and their developments is found also as regards the Reason. There is, we know, a Religion of enthusiasm, of superstitious ignorance of statecraft; and each has that in it which resembles Catholicism, and that again which contradicts Catholicism. There is the Religion of a warlike people, and of a pastoral people; there is a Religion of rude times, and in like manner there is a Religion of civilized times, of the cultivated intellect, of the philosopher, scholar, and gentleman. This is that Religion of Reason, of which I speak. Viewed in itself, however near it comes to Catholicism, it is of course simply distinct from it; for Catholicism is one whole, and admits of no compromise or modification. Yet this is to view it in the abstract; in matter of fact, and in reference to individuals, we can have no difficulty in conceiving this philosophical Religion present in a

Catholic country, as a spirit influencing men to a certain extent, for good or for bad or for both,—a spirit of the age, which may again be found, as among Catholics, so with still greater sway and success in a country not Catholic, yet specifically the same in such a country as it exists in a Catholic community. The problem then before us to-day, is to set down some portions of the outline, if we can ascertain them, of the Religion of Civilization, and to determine how they lie relatively to those principles, doctrines, and rules, which Heaven has given us in the Catholic Church.

And here again, when I speak of Revealed Truth, it is scarcely necessary to say that I am not referring to the main articles and prominent points of faith, as contained in the Creed. Had I undertaken to delineate a philosophy, which directly interfered with the Creed, I could not have spoken of it as compatible with the profession of Catholicism. The philosophy I speak of, whether it be viewed within or outside the Church, does not necessarily take cognizance of the Creed. Where the country is Catholic, the educated mind takes its articles for granted, by a sort of implicit faith; where it is not, it simply ignores them and the whole subject-matter to which they relate, as not affecting social and political interests. Truths about God's Nature, about His dealings towards the human race, about the Economy of Redemption,—in the one case it humbly accepts them, and passes on; in the other it passes them over, as matters of simple opinion, which never can be decided, and which can have no power over us to make us morally better or worse. I am not speaking

then of belief in the great objects of faith, when I speak of Catholicism, but I am contemplating Catholicism chiefly as a system of pastoral instruction and moral duty; and I have to do with its doctrines mainly as they are subservient to its direction of the conscience and the conduct. I speak of it, for instance, as teaching the ruined state of man; his utter inability to gain Heaven by any thing he can do himself; the moral certainty of his losing his soul if left to himself; the simple absence of all rights and claims on the part of the creature in the presence of the Creator; the illimitable claims of the Creator on the service of the creature; the imperative and obligatory force of the voice of conscience; and the inconceivable evil of sensuality. I speak of it as teaching, that no one gains Heaven except by the free grace of God, or without a regeneration of nature; that no one can please Him without faith; that the heart is the seat both of sin and of obedience; that charity is the fulfilling of the Law; and that incorporation into the Catholic Church is the ordinary instrument of salvation. These are the lessons which distinguish Catholicism as a popular religion, and these are the subjects to which the cultivated intellect will practically be turned:—I have to compare and contrast, not the doctrinal, but the moral and social teaching of Philosophy on the one hand, and Catholicism on the other.

3.

Now, on opening the subject, we see at once a momentous benefit which the philosopher is likely to con-

fer on the pastors of the Church. It is obvious that the first step which they have to effect in the conversion of man and the renovation of his nature, is his rescue from that fearful subjection to sense which is his ordinary state. To be able to break through the meshes of that thraldom, and to disentangle and to disengage its ten thousand holds upon the heart, is to bring it, I might almost say, half way to Heaven. Here, even divine grace, to speak of things according to their appearances, is ordinarily baffled, and retires, without expedient or resource, before this giant fascination. Religion seems too high and unearthly to be able to exert a continued influence upon us: its effort to rouse the soul, and the soul's effort to co-operate, are too violent to last. It is like holding out the arm at full length, or supportiug some great weight, which we manage to do for a time, but soon are exhausted and succumb. Nothing can act beyond its own nature; when then we are called to what is supernatural, though those extraordinary aids from Heaven are given us, with which obedience becomes possible, yet even with them it is of transcendent difficulty. We are drawn down to earth every moment with the ease and certainty of a natural gravitation, and it only by sudden impulses and, as it were, forcible plunges that we attempt to mount upwards. Religion indeed enlightens, terrifies, subdues; it gives faith, it inflicts remorse, it inspires resolutions, it draws tears, it inflames devotion, but only for the occasion. I repeat, it imparts an inward power which ought to effect more than this; I am not forgetting either the real suffi-

ciency of its aids, nor the responsibility of those in whom they fail. I am not discussing theological questions at all, I am looking at phenomena as they lie before me, and I say that, in matter of fact, the sinful spirit repents, and protests it will never sin again, and for a while is protected by disgust and abhorrence from the malice of its foe. But that foe knows too well that such seasons of repentance are wont to have their end: he patiently waits, till nature faints with the effort of resistance, and lies passive and hopeless under the next access of temptation. What we need then is some expedient or instrument, which at least will obstruct and stave off the approach of our spiritual enemy, and which is sufficiently congenial and level with our nature to maintain as firm a hold upon us as the inducements of sensual gratification. It will be our wisdom to employ nature against itself. Thus sorrow, sickness, and care are providential antagonists to our inward disorders; they come upon us as years pass on, and generally produce their natural effects on us, in proportion as we are subjected to their influence. These, however, are God's instruments, not ours; we need a similar remedy, which we can make our own, the object of some legitimate faculty, or the aim of some natural affection, which is capable of resting on the mind, and taking up its familiar lodging with it, and engrossing it, and which thus becomes a match for the besetting power of sensuality, and a sort of homœopathic medicine for the disease. Here then I think is the important aid which intellectual cultivation furnishes to us in rescuing the victims of passion and self-will. It does not supply

religious motives; it is not the cause or proper antecedent of any thing supernatural; it is not meritorious of heavenly aid or reward; but it does a work, at least *materially* good (as theologians speak), whatever be its real and formal character. It expels the excitements of sense by the introduction of those of the intellect.

This then is the *primâ facie* advantage of the pursuit of Knowledge; it is the drawing the mind off from things which will harm it to subjects which are worthy a rational being; and, though it does not raise it above nature, nor has any tendency to make us pleasing to our Maker, yet is it nothing to substitute what is in itself harmless for what is, to say the least, inexpressibly dangerous? is it a little thing to exchange a circle of ideas which are certainly sinful, for others which are certainly not so? You will say, perhaps, in the words of the Apostle, "Knowledge puffeth up": and doubtless this mental cultivation, even when it is successful for the purpose for which I am applying it, may be from the first nothing more than the substitution of pride for sensuality. I grant it, I think I shall have something to say on this point presently; but this is not a necessary result, it is but an incidental evil, a danger which may be realized or may be averted, whereas we may in most cases predicate guilt, and guilt of a heinous kind, where the mind is suffered to run wild and indulge its thoughts without training or law of any kind; and surely to turn away a soul from mortal sin is a good and a gain so far, whatever comes of it. And therefore, if a friend in need is twice a friend, I conceive that intellectual employments,

though they do no more than occupy the mind with objects naturally noble or innocent, have a special claim upon our consideration and gratitude.

4.

Nor is this all: Knowledge, the discipline by which it is gained, and the tastes which it forms, have a natural tendency to refine the mind, and to give it an indisposition, simply natural, yet real, nay, more than this, a disgust and abhorrence, towards excesses and enormities of evil, which are often or ordinarily reached at length by those who are not careful from the first to set themselves against what is vicious and criminal. It generates within the mind a fastidiousness, analogous to the delicacy or daintiness which good nurture or a sickly habit induces in respect of food; and this fastidiousness, though arguing no high principle, though no protection in the case of violent temptation, nor sure in its operation, yet will often or generally be lively enough to create an absolute loathing of certain offences, or a detestation and scorn of them as ungentlemanlike, to which ruder natures, nay, such as have far more of real religion in them, are tempted, or even betrayed. Scarcely can we exaggerate the value, in its place, of a safeguard such as this, as regards those multitudes who are thrown upon the open field of the world, or are withdrawn from its eye and from the restraint of public opinion. In many cases, where it exists, sins, familiar to those who are otherwise circumstanced, will not even occur to the mind: in others,

the sense of shame and the quickened apprehension of detection will act as a sufficient obstacle to them, when they do present themselves before it. Then, again, the fastidiousness I am speaking of will create a simple hatred of that miserable tone of conversation which, obtaining as it does in the world, is a constant fuel of evil, heaped up round about the soul: moreover, it will create an irresolution and indecision in doing wrong, which will act as a *remora* till the danger is past away. And though it has no tendency, I repeat, to mend the heart, or to secure it from the dominion in other shapes of those very evils which it repels in the particular modes of approach by which they prevail over others, yet cases may occur when it gives birth, after sins have been committed, to so keen a remorse and so intense a self-hatred, as are even sufficient to cure the particular moral disorder, and to prevent its accesses ever afterwards;—as the spendthrift in the story, who, after gazing on his lost acres from the summit of an eminence, came down a miser, and remained a miser to the end of his days.

And all this holds good in a special way, in an age such as ours, when, although pain of body and mind may be as rife as heretofore, yet other counteractions of evil, of a penal character, which are present at other times, are away. In rude and semi-barbarous periods, at least in a climate such as our own, it is the daily, nay, the principal business of the senses, to convey feelings of discomfort to the mind, as far as they convey feelings at all. Exposure to the elements, social disorder and lawlessness, the tyranny of the powerful, and the in-

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roads of enemies, are a stern discipline, allowing brief intervals, or awarding a sharp penance, to sloth and sensuality. The rude food, the scanty clothing, the violent exercise, the vagrant life, the military constraint, the imperfect pharmacy, which now are the trials of only particular classes of the community, were once the lot more or less of all. In the deep woods or the wild solitudes of the medieval era, feelings of religion or superstition were naturally present to the population, which in various ways co-operated with the missionary or pastor, in retaining it in a noble simplicity of manners. But, when in the advancement of society men congregate in towns, and multiply in contracted spaces, and law gives them security, and art gives them comforts, and good government robs them of courage and manliness, and monotony of life throws them back upon themselves, who does not see that diversion or protection from evil they have none, that vice is the mere reaction of unhealthy toil, and sensual excess the holyday of resourceless ignorance. This is so well understood by the practical benevolence of the day, that it has especially busied itself in plans for supplying the masses of our town population with intellectual and honourable recreations. Cheap literature, libraries of useful and entertaining knowledge, scientific lectureships, museums, zoological collections, buildings and gardens to please the eye and to give repose to the feelings, external objects of whatever kind, which may take the mind off itself, and expand and elevate it in liberal contemplations, these are the human means, wisely suggested, and good as far as

they go, for at least parrying the assaults of moral evil, and keeping at bay the enemies, not only of the individual soul, but of society at large.

Such are the instruments by which an age of advanced civilization combats those moral disorders, which Reason as well as Revelation denounces; and I have not been backward to express my sense of their serviceableness to Religion. Moreover, they are but the foremost of a series of influences, which intellectual culture exerts upon our moral nature, and all upon the type of Christianity, manifesting themselves in veracity, probity, equity, fairness, gentleness, benevolence, and amiableness; so much so, that a character more noble to look at, more beautiful, more winning, in the various relations of life and in personal duties, is hardly conceivable, than may, or might be, its result, when that culture is bestowed upon a soil naturally adapted to virtue. If you would obtain a picture for contemplation which may seem to fulfil the ideal, which the Apostle has delineated under the name of charity, in its sweetness and harmony, its generosity, its courtesy to others, and its depreciation of self, you could not have recourse to a better furnished *studio* than to that of Philosophy, with the specimens of it, which with greater or less exactness are scattered through society in a civilized age. It is enough to refer you, Gentlemen, to the various Biographies and Remains of contemporaries and others, which from time to time issue from the press, to see how striking is the action of our intellectual upon our moral nature, where the moral material is rich, and the intellectual cast is perfect.

Individuals will occur to all of us, who deservedly attract our love and admiration, and whom the world almost worships as the work of its own hands. Religious principle, indeed,—that is, faith,—is, to all appearance, simply away; the work is as certainly not supernatural as it is certainly noble and beautiful. This must be insisted on, that the Intellect may have its due; but it also must be insisted on for the sake of conclusions to which I wish to conduct our investigation. The radical difference indeed of this mental refinement from genuine religion, in spite of its seeming relationship, is the very cardinal point on which my present discussion turns; yet, on the other hand, such refinement may readily be assigned to a Christian origin by hasty or distant observers, or by those who view it in a particular light. And as this is the case, I think it advisable, before proceeding with the delineation of its characteristic features, to point out to you distinctly the elementary principles on which its morality is based.

5.

You will bear in mind then, Gentlemen, that I spoke just now of the scorn and hatred which a cultivated mind feels for some kinds of vice, and the utter disgust and profound humiliation which may come over it, if it should happen in any degree to be betrayed into them. Now this feeling may have its root in faith and love, but it may not; there is nothing really religious in it, considered by itself. Conscience indeed is implanted in the breast by nature, but it inflicts upon us

fear as well as shame; when the mind is simply angry with itself and nothing more, surely the true import of the voice of nature and the depth of its intimations have been forgotten, and a false philosophy has misinterpreted emotions which ought to lead to God. Fear implies the transgression of a law, and a law implies a lawgiver and judge; but the tendency of intellectual culture is to swallow up the fear in the self-reproach, and self-reproach is directed and limited to our mere sense of what is fitting and becoming. Fear carries us out of ourselves, whereas shame may act upon us only within the round of our own thoughts. Such, I say, is the danger which awaits a civilized age; such is its besetting sin (not inevitable, God forbid! or we must abandon the use of God's own gifts), but still the ordinary sin of the Intellect; conscience tends to become what is called a moral sense; the command of duty is a sort of taste; sin is not an offence against God, but against human nature.

The less amiable specimens of this spurious religion are those which we meet not infrequently in my own country. I can use with all my heart the poet's words,

> "England, with all thy faults, I love thee still;" Cowper 1731-18

but to those faults no Catholic can be blind. We find there men possessed of many virtues, but proud, bashful, fastidious, and reserved. Why is this? it is because they think and act as if there were really nothing objective in their religion; it is because conscience to them is not the word of a lawgiver, as it ought to be, but the dictate of their own minds and nothing more;

it is because they do not look out of themselves, because they do not look through and beyond their own minds to their Maker, but are engrossed in notions of what is due to themselves, to their own dignity and their own consistency. Their conscience has become a mere self-respect. Instead of doing one thing and then another, as each is called for, in faith and obedience, careless of what may be called the *keeping* of deed with deed, and leaving Him who gives the command to blend the portions of their conduct into a whole, their one object, however unconscious to themselves, is to paint a smooth and perfect surface, and to be able to say to themselves that they have done their duty. When they do wrong, they feel, not contrition, of which God is the object, but remorse, and a sense of degradation. They call themselves fools, not sinners; they are angry and impatient, not humble. They shut themselves up in themselves; it is misery to them to think or to speak of their own feelings; it is misery to suppose that others see them, and their shyness and sensitiveness often become morbid. As to confession, which is so natural to the Catholic, to them it is impossible; unless indeed, in cases where they have been guilty, an apology is due to their own character, is expected of them, and will be satisfactory to look back upon. They are victims of an intense self-contemplation.

There are, however, far more pleasing and interesting forms of this moral malady than that which I have been depicting; I have spoken of the effect of intellectual culture on proud natures; but it will show to greater advantage, yet with as little approximation to

religious faith, in amiable and unaffected minds. Observe, Gentlemen, the heresy, as it may be called, of which I speak, is the substitution of a moral sense or taste for conscience in the true meaning of the word; now this error may be the foundation of a character of far more elasticity and grace than ever adorned the persons whom I have been describing. It is especially congenial to men of an imaginative and poetical cast of mind, who will readily accept the notion that virtue is nothing more than the graceful in conduct. Such persons, far from tolerating fear, as a principle, in their apprehension of religious and moral truth, will not be slow to call it simply gloom and superstition. Rather a philosopher's, a gentleman's religion, is of a liberal and generous character; it is based upon honour; vice is evil, because it is unworthy, despicable, and odious. This was the quarrel of the ancient heathen with Christianity, that, instead of simply fixing the mind on the fair and the pleasant, it intermingled other ideas with them of a sad and painful nature; that it spoke of tears before joy, a cross before a crown; that it laid the foundation of heroism in penance; that it made the soul tremble with the news of Purgatory and Hell; that it insisted on views and a worship of the Deity, which to their minds was nothing else than mean, servile, and cowardly. The notion of an All-perfect, Ever-present God, in whose sight we are less than atoms, and who, while He deigns to visit us, can punish as well as bless, was abhorrent to them; they made their own minds their sanctuary, their own ideas their oracle, and conscience in morals was but

parallel to genius in art, and wisdom in philosophy.

6.

Had I room for all that might be said upon the subject, I might illustrate this intellectual religion from the history of the Emperor Julian, the apostate from Christian Truth, the foe of Christian education. He, in whom every Catholic sees the shadow of the future Anti-Christ, was all but the pattern-man of philosophical virtue. Weak points in his character he had, it is true, even in a merely poetical standard; but, take him all in all, and I cannot but recognize in him a specious beauty and nobleness of moral deportment which combines in it the rude greatness of Fabricius or Regulus with the accomplishments of Pliny or Antoninus. His simplicity of manners, his frugality, his austerity of life, his singular disdain of sensual pleasure, his military heroism, his application to business, his literary diligence, his modesty, his clemency, his accomplishments, as I view them, go to make him one of the most eminent specimens of pagan virtue which the world has ever seen.* Yet how shallow,

* I do not consider I have said above any thing inconsistent with the following passage from Cardinal Gerdil, though I have enlarged on the favourable side of Julian's character. "Du génie, des connaissances, de l'habilité dans le métier de la guerre, du courage et du désintéressement dans le commandement des armées, des actions plutôt que des qualités estimables, mais le plus souvent gâtées par la vanité qui en était le principe la superstition jointe à l'hypocrisie; un esprit fécond en ressources éclairé, mais susceptible de petitesse; des fautes essentielles dans

how meagre, nay, how unamiable is that virtue after all, when brought upon its critical trial by his sudden summons into the presence of his Judge! His last hours form a *unique* passage in history, both as illustrating the helplessness of philosophy under the stern realities of our being, and as being reported to us on the evidence of an eye-witness. "Friends and fellow-soldiers," he said, to use the words of a writer, well fitted, both from his literary tastes and from his hatred of Christianity, to be his panegyrist, "the seasonable period of my departure is now arrived, and I discharge, with the cheerfulness of a ready debtor, the demands of nature . . . . I die without remorse, as I have lived without guilt. I am pleased to reflect on the innocence of my private life; and I can affirm with confidence that the supreme authority, that emanation of the divine Power, has been preserved in my hands pure and immaculate . . . I now offer my tribute of gratitude to the Eternal Being, who has not suffered me to perish by the cruelty of a tyrant, by the secret dagger of conspiracy, or by the slow tortures of lingering disease. He has given me, in the midst of an honourable career, a splendid and glorious departure from this world, and I hold it equally absurd, equally base, to solicit, or to decline, the stroke of fate. . . .

"He reproved the immoderate grief of the spectators, and conjured them not to disgrace, by unmanly

le gouvernement; des innocens sacrifiés à la vengeance; une haîne envenimée contre le Christianisme, qu'il avait abandonné; un attachement passionné aux folies de la Théurgie; tels étaient les traits sous lesquels on nous preignait Julien." Op. t. x. p. 54.

tears, the fate of a prince who in a few moments would be united with Heaven and with the stars. The spectators were silent; and Julian entered into a metaphysical argument with the philosophers Priscus and Maximus on the nature of the soul. The efforts which he made, of mind as well as body, most probably hastened his death. His wound began to bleed with great violence; his respiration was embarrassed by the swelling of the veins; he called for a draught of cold water, and as soon as he had drunk it expired without pain, about the hour of midnight."* Such, Gentlemen, is the final exhibition of the Religion of Reason: in the insensibility of conscience, in the ignorance of the very idea of sin, in the contemplation of his own moral consistency, in the simple absence of fear, in the cloudless self-confidence, in the serene self-possession, in the cold self-satisfaction, we recognize the mere Philosopher.

7.

Gibbon paints with pleasure what, conformably with the sentiments of a godless intellectualism, was an historical fulfilment of his own idea of moral perfection; Lord Shaftesbury had already drawn out that idea in a theoretical form, in his celebrated collection of Treatises which he has called "Characteristics of men, manners, opinions, views"; and it will be a further illustration of the subject before us, if you will allow me, Gentlemen, to make some extracts from this work.

* Gibbon, Hist., ch. 24.

One of his first attacks is directed against the doctrine of reward and punishment, as if it introduced a notion into religion inconsistent with the true apprehension of the beauty of virtue, and with the liberality and nobleness of spirit in which it should be pursued. "Men have not been content," he says, "to show the natural advantages of honesty and virtue. They have rather lessened these, the better, as they thought, to advance another foundation. They have made virtue so mercenary a thing, and have talked so much of its rewards that one can hardly tell what there is in it after all, which can be worth rewarding. For to be *bribed* only or *terrified* into an honest practice, bespeaks little of real honesty or worth." "If," he says elsewhere, insinuating what he dare not speak out, "if through hope merely of reward, or fear of punishment, the creature be inclined to do the good he hates, or restrained from doing the ill to which he is not otherwise in the least degree averse, there is in this case no virtue or goodness whatever. There is no more of rectitude, piety, or sanctity, in a creature thus reformed, than there is meekness or gentleness in a tiger strongly chained, or innocence and sobriety in a monkey under the discipline of the whip. . . . While the will is neither gained, nor the inclination wrought upon, but awe alone prevails and forces obedience, the obedience is servile, and all which is done through it merely servile." That is, he says that Christianity is the enemy of moral virtue, as influencing the mind by fear of God, not by love of good.

The motives then of hope and fear being, to say the

least, put far into the background, and nothing being morally good but what springs simply or mainly from a love of virtue for its own sake, this love-inspiring quality in virtue is its beauty, while a bad conscience is not much more than the sort of feeling which makes us shrink from an instrument out of tune. "Some by mere nature," he says, "others by art and practice, are masters of an ear in music, an eye in painting, a fancy in the ordinary things of ornament and grace, a judgment in proportions of all kinds, and a general good taste in most of those subjects which make the amusement and delight of the ingenious people of the world. Let such gentlemen as these be as extravagant as they please, or as irregular in their morals, they must at the same time discover their *inconsistency*, live at *variance* with themselves, and in *contradiction* to that principle on which they ground their highest pleasure and entertainment. Of all other *beauties* which virtuosos pursue, poets celebrate, musicians sing, and architects or artists of whatever kind describe or form, the most delightful, the most engaging and pathetic, is that which is drawn from real life and from the passions. Nothing affects the heart like that which is purely from itself, and of its own nature: such as the beauty of sentiments, the grace of actions, the turn of characters, and the *proportions and features* of a human mind. This lesson of philosophy, even a romance, a poem, or a play may teach us. . . . Let poets or the men of harmony deny, if they can, this force of nature, or withstand this *moral magic*. . . . Every one is a virtuoso of a higher or lower degree; every one pursues

a grace . . . of one kind or other. The *venustum*, the *honestum*, the *decorum* of things will force its way. . . . The most natural beauty in the world is honesty and moral truth; for all beauty is truth."

Accordingly, virtue being only one kind of beauty, the principle which determines what is virtuous is, not conscience, but *taste*. "Could we once convince ourselves," he says, "of what is in itself so evident, viz., that in the very nature of things there must of necessity be the foundation of a right and wrong *taste*, as well in respect of inward character of features as of outward person, behaviour, and action, we should be far more ashamed of ignorance and wrong judgment in the former than in the latter of these subjects. . . . One who aspires to the character of a man of breeding and politeness is careful to form his judgment of arts and sciences upon right models of perfection. . . . He takes particular care to turn his eye from every thing which is gaudy, luscious, and of false taste. Nor is he less careful to turn his ear from every sort of music, besides that which is of the best manner and truest harmony. 'Twere to be wished we had the same regard to a *right taste in life and manners*. . . . If civility and humanity be a taste; if brutality, insolence, riot, be in the same manner a taste, . . . who would not endeavour to force nature as well in this respect as in what relates to a taste or judgment in other arts and sciences?"

Sometimes he distinctly contrasts this taste with principle and conscience, and gives it the preference over them. "After all," he says, "*'tis not merely what we call principle*, but *a taste*, which governs men. They

may think for certain, 'This is right,' or 'that wrong'; they may believe 'this is a virtue,' or 'that a sin'; 'this is punishable by man,' or 'that by God'; yet if the savour of things lies cross to honesty, if the fancy be florid, and the appetite high towards the subaltern beauties and lower orders of worldly symmetries and proportions, the conduct will infallibly turn this latter way." Thus, somewhat like a Jansenist, he makes the superior pleasure infallibly conquer, and implies that neglecting principle, we have but to train the taste to a kind of beauty higher than sensual. He adds, "*Even conscience*, I fear, such as is owing to religious discipline, will make but a slight figure, when this taste is set amiss."

And hence the well-known doctrine of this author, that ridicule is the test of truth; for truth and virtue being beauty, and falsehood and vice deformity, and the feeling inspired by deformity being that of derision, as that inspired by beauty is admiration, it follows that vice is not a thing to weep about, but to laugh at. "Nothing is ridiculous," he says, "but what is deformed; nor is any thing proof against raillery but what is handsome and just. And therefore 'tis the hardest thing in the world to deny fair honesty the use of this weapon, which can never bear an edge against herself, and bears against every thing contrary."

And hence again, conscience, which intimates a Lawgiver, being superseded by a moral taste or sentiment, which has no sanction beyond the constitution of our nature, it follows that our great rule is to contemplate ourselves, if we would gain a standard of life and morals.

Thus he has entitled one of his Treatises a "Soliloquy," with the motto, "Nec te quæsiveris extra"; and he observes, "The chief interest of ambition, avarice, corruption, and every sly insinuating vice, is to prevent this interview and familiarity of discourse, which is consequent upon close retirement and inward recess. 'Tis the grand artifice of villiany and lewdness, *as well as of superstition and bigotry*, to put us upon terms of greater distance and formality with ourselves, and evade our *proving* method of soliloquy. . . . A passionate lover, whatever solitude he may affect, can never be truly by himself. . . . 'Tis the same reason which keeps the imaginary saint or mystic from being capable of this entertainment. Instead of looking narrowly into his own nature and mind, that he may be no longer a mystery to himself, he is taken up with *the contemplation of other mysterious natures*, which he never can explain or comprehend."

8.

Taking these passages as specimens of what I call the Religion of Philosophy, it is obvious to observe that there is no doctrine contained in them which is not in a certain sense true; yet, on the other hand, that almost every statement is perverted and made false, because it is not the whole truth. They are exhibitions of truth under one aspect, and therefore insufficient; conscience is most certainly a moral sense, but it is more; vice again, is a deformity, but it is worse. Lord Shaftesbury may insist, if he will, that

simple and solitary fear cannot effect a moral conversion, and we are not concerned to answer him; but he will have a difficulty in proving that any real conversion follows from a doctrine which makes virtue a mere point of good taste, and vice vulgar and ungentlemanlike.

Such a doctrine is essentially superficial, and such will be its effects. It has no better measure of right and wrong than that of visible beauty and tangible fitness. Conscience indeed inflicts an acute pang, but that pang, forsooth, is irrational, and to reverence it is an illiberal superstition. But, if we will make light of what is deepest within us, nothing is left but to pay homage to what is more upon the surface. To *seem* becomes to *be;* what looks fair will be good, what causes offence will be evil; virtue will be what pleases, vice what pains. As well may we measure virtue by utility as by such a rule. Nor is this an imaginary apprehension; we all must recollect the celebrated sentiment into which a great and wise man was betrayed, in the glowing eloquence of his valediction to the spirit of chivalry. "It is gone," cries Mr. Burke; "that sensibility of principle, that chastity of honour, which felt a stain like a wound; which inspired courage, while it mitigated ferocity; which ennobled whatever it touched, and under which *vice lost half its evil by losing all its grossness!*" In the last clause of this beautiful sentence we have too apt an illustration of the ethical temperament of a civilized age. It is detection, not the sin, which is the crime; private life is sacred, and inquiry into it is intolerable; and decency is virtue. Scandals, vul-

garities, whatever shocks, whatever disgusts, are offences of the first order. Drinking and swearing, squalid poverty, improvidence, laziness, slovenly disorder, make up the idea of profligacy: poets may say any thing however wicked, with impunity; works of genius may be read without danger or shame, whatever their principles; fashion, celebrity, the beautiful, the heroic, will suffice to force any evil upon the community. The splendours of a court, and the charms of good society, wit, imagination, taste, and high breeding, the *prestige* of rank, and the resources of wealth, are a screen, an instrument, and an apology for vice and irreligion. And thus at length we find, surprising as the change may be, that that very refinement of Intellectualism, which began by repelling sensuality, ends by excusing it. Under the shadow indeed of the Church, and in its due development, Philosophy does service to the cause of morality; but when it is strong enough to have a will of its own, and is lifted up with an idea of its own importance, and attempts to form a theory, and to lay down a principle, and to carry out a system of ethics, and undertakes the moral education of the man, then it does but abet evils to which at first it seemed instinctively opposed. True Religion is slow in growth, and, when once planted, is difficult of dislodgment; but its intellectual counterfeit has no root in itself: it springs up suddenly, it suddenly withers. It appeals to what is in nature, and it falls under the dominion of the old Adam. Then, like dethroned princes, it keeps up a state and majesty, when it has lost the real power. Deformity is its abhorrence; ac-

cordingly, since it cannot dissuade men from vice, therefore in order to escape the sight of its deformity, it embellishes it. It "skins and films the ulcerous place," which it cannot probe or heal,

> "Whiles rank corruption, mining all within,
> Infects unseen."

And from this shallowness of philosophical Religion it comes to pass that its disciples seem able to fulfil certain precepts of Christianity more readily and exactly than Christians themselves. St. Paul, as I have said, gives us a pattern of evangelical perfection; he draws the Christian character in its most graceful form, and its most beautiful hues. He discourses of that charity which is patient and meek, humble and single-minded, disinterested, contented, and persevering. He tells us to prefer each the other before himself, to give way to each other, to abstain from rude words and evil speech, to avoid self-conceit, to be calm and grave, to be cheerful and happy, to observe peace with all men, truth and justice, courtesy and gentleness, all that is modest, amiable, virtuous, and of good repute. Such is St. Paul's exemplar of the Christian in his external relations; and, I repeat, the school of the world seems to send out living copies of this typical excellence with greater success than the Church. At this day the "gentleman" is the creation, not of Christianity, but of civilization. But the reason is obvious. The world is content with setting right the surface of things; the Church aims at regenerating the very depths of the heart. She ever begins with the begin-

ning; and, as regards the multitude of her children, is never able to get beyond the beginning, but is continually employed in laying the foundation. She is engaged with what is essential, as previous and as introductory to the ornamental and the attractive. She is curing men and keeping them clear of mortal sin; she is "treating of justice and chastity, and the judgment to come": she is insisting on faith and hope, and devotion, and honesty, and the elements of charity; and has so much to do with precept, that she almost leaves it to inspirations from Heaven to suggest what is of counsel and perfection. She aims at what is necessary rather than at what is desirable. She is for the many as well as for the few. She is putting souls in the way of salvation, that they may then be in a condition, if they shall be called upon, to aspire to the heroic, and to attain the full proportions, as well as the rudiments, of the beautiful.

9.

Such is the method, or the policy (so to call it), of the Church; but Philosophy looks at the matter from a very different point of view: what have Philosophers to do with the terror of judgment or the saving of the soul? Lord Shaftesbury calls the former a sort of "panic fear." Of the latter he scoffingly complains that "the saving of souls is now the heroic passion of exalted spirits." Of course he is at liberty, on his principles, to pick and choose out of Christianity what he will; he discards the theological, the mysterious, the

spiritual; he makes selection of the morally or esthetically beautiful. To him it matters not at all that he begins his teaching where he should end it; it matters not that, instead of planting the tree, he merely crops its flowers for his banquet; he only aims at the present life, his philosophy dies with him; if his flowers do but last to the end of his revel, he has nothing more to seek. When night comes, the withered leaves may be mingled with his own ashes; he and they will have done their work, he and they will be no more. Certainly, it costs little to make men virtuous on conditions such as these; it is like teaching them a language or an accomplishment, to write Latin or to play on an instrument,—the profession of an artist, not the commission of an Apostle.

This embellishment of the exterior is almost the beginning and the end of philosophical morality. This is why it aims at being modest rather than humble; this is how it can be proud at the very time that it is unassuming. To humility indeed it does not even aspire; humility is one of the most difficult of virtues both to attain and to ascertain. It lies close upon the heart itself, and its tests are exceedingly delicate and subtle. Its counterfeits abound; however, we are little concerned with them here, for, I repeat, it is hardly professed even by name in the code of ethics which we are reviewing. As has been often observed, ancient civilization had not the idea, and had no word to express it: or rather, it had the idea, and considered it a defect of mind, not a virtue, so that the word which denoted it conveyed a reproach. As to the modern

world, you may gather its ignorance of it by its perversion of the somewhat parallel term " condescension." Humility or condescension, viewed as a virtue of conduct, may be said to consist, as in other things, so in our placing ourselves in our thoughts on a level with our inferiors; it is not only a voluntary relinquishment of the privileges of our own station, but an actual participation or assumption of the condition of those to whom we stoop. This is true humility, to feel and to behave as if we were low; not to cherish a notion of our importance, while we affect a low position. Such was St. Paul's humility, when he called himself " the least of the saints;" such the humility of those many holy men who have considered themselves the greatest of sinners. It is an abdication, as far as their own thoughts are concerned, of those prerogatives or privileges to which others deem them entitled. Now it is not a little instructive to contrast with this idea, Gentlemen,—with this theological meaning of the word " condescension,"—its proper English sense; put them in juxta-position, and you will at once see the difference between the world's humility and the humility of the Gospel. As the world uses the word, " condescension" is a stooping indeed of the person, but a bending forward, unattended with any the slightest effort to leave by a single inch the seat in which it so firmly established. It is the act of a superior, who protests to himself, while he commits it, that he is superior still, and that he is doing nothing else but an act of grace towards those on whose level, in theory, he is placing himself. And this is the nearest idea which

the philosopher can form of the virtue of self-abasement; to do more than this is to his mind a meanness or an hypocrisy, and at once excites his suspicion and disgust. What the world is, such it has ever been; we know the contempt which the educated pagans had for the martyrs and confessors of the Church; and it is shared by the anti-Catholic bodies of this day.

Such are the ethics of Philosophy, when faithfully represented; but an age like this, not pagan, but professedly Christian, cannot venture to reprobate humility in set terms, or to make a boast of pride. Accordingly, it looks out for some expedient by which it may blind itself to the real state of the case. Humility, with its grave and self-denying attributes, it cannot love; but what is more beautiful, what more winning, than modesty? what virtue, at first sight, simulates humility so well? though what in fact is more radically distinct from it? In truth, great as is its charm, modesty is not the deepest or the most religious of virtues. Rather it is the advanced guard or sentinel of the soul militant, and watches continually over its nascent intercourse with the world about it. It goes the round of the senses; it mounts up into the countenance; it protects the eye and ear; it reigns in the voice and gesture. Its province is the outward deportment, as other virtues have relation to matters theological, others to society, and others to the mind itself. And being more superficial than other virtues, it is more easily disjoined from their company; it admits of being associated with principles or qualities naturally foreign to it, and is often made the cloak of feelings

or ends for which it was never given to us. So little is it the necessary index of humility, that it is even compatible with pride. The better for the purpose of Philosophy; humble it cannot be, so forthwith modesty becomes its humility.

Pride, under such training, instead of running to waste in the education of the mind, is turned to account; it gets a new name; it is called self-respect; and ceases to be the disagreeable, uncompanionable quality which it is in itself. Though it be the motive principle of the soul, it seldom comes to view; and when it shows itself, then delicacy and gentleness are its attire, and good sense and sense of honour direct its motions. It is no longer a restless agent, without definite aim; it has a large field of exertion assigned to it, and it subserves those social interests which it would naturally trouble. It is directed into the channel of industry, frugality, honesty, and obedience; and it becomes the very staple of the religion and morality held in honour in a day like our own. It becomes the safeguard of chastity, the guarantee of veracity, in high and low; it is the very household god of society, as at present consitituted, inspiring neatness and decency in the servant girl, propriety of carriage and refined manners in her mistress, uprightness, manliness, and generosity in the head of the family. It diffuses a light over town and country; it covers the soil with handsome edifices and smiling gardens; it tills the field, it stocks and embellishes the shop. It is the stimulating principle of providence on the one hand, and of free expenditure on the other; of an

honourable ambition, and of elegant enjoyment. It breathes upon the face of the community, and the hollow sepulchre is forthwith beautiful to look upon.

Refined by the civilization which has brought it into activity, this self-respect infuses into the mind an intense horror of exposure, and a keen sensitiveness of notoriety and ridicule. It becomes the enemy of extravagances of any kind; it shrinks from what are called scenes; it has no mercy on the mock-heroic, on pretence or egotism, on verbosity in language, or what is called prosiness in conversation. It detests gross adulation; not that it tends at all to the eradication of the appetite to which the flatterer ministers, but it sees the absurdity of indulging it, it understands the annoyance thereby given to others, and if a tribute must be paid to the wealthy or the powerful, it demands greater sublety and art in the preparation. Thus vanity is changed into a more dangerous self-conceit, as being checked in its natural eruption. It teaches men to suppress their feelings, and to control their tempers, and to mitigate both the severity and the tone of their judgments. As Lord Shaftesbury would desire, it prefers playful wit and satire in putting down what is objectionable, as a more refined and good-natured, as well as a more effectual method, than the expedient which is natural to uneducated minds. It is from this impatience of the tragic and the bombastic that it is now quietly but energetically opposing itself to the unchristian practice of duelling, which it brands as simply out of taste, and as the remnant of a barbarous

age; and certainly it seems likely to effect what Religion has aimed at abolishing in vain.

10.

Hence it is that it is almost a definition of a gentleman to say he is one who never inflicts pain. This description is both refined and, as far as it goes, accurate. He is mainly occupied in merely removing the obstacles which hinder the free and unembarrassed action of those about him; and he concurs with their movements rather than takes the initiative himself. His benefits may be considered as parallel to what are called comforts or conveniences in arrangements of a personal nature: like an easy chair or a good fire, which do their part in dispelling cold and fatigue, though nature provides both means of rest and animal heat without them. The true gentleman in like manner carefully avoids whatever may cause a jar or a jolt in the minds of those which whom he is cast;—all clashing of opinion, or collision of feeling, all restraint, or suspicion, or gloom, or resentment; his great concern being to make every one at their ease and at home. He has his eyes on all his company; he is tender towards the bashful, gentle towards the distant, and merciful towards the absurd; he can recollect to whom he is speaking; he guards against unseasonable allusions, or topics which may irritate: he is seldom prominent in conversation, and never wearisome. He makes light of favours while he does them, and seems to be receiving when he is conferring. He never speaks of himself except when compelled,

never defends himself by a mere retort, he has no ears for slander or gossip, is scrupulous in imputing motives to those who interefere with him, and interprets every thing for the best. He is never mean or little in his disputes, never takes unfair advantage, never mistakes personalities or sharp sayings for arguments, or insinuates evil which he dare not say out. From a long-sighted prudence, he observes the maxim of the ancient sage, that we should ever conduct ourselves towards our enemy as if he were one day to be our friend. He has too much good sense to be affronted at insults, he is too well employed to remember injuries, and too indolent to bear malice. He is patient, forbearing, and resigned, on philosophical principles; he submits to pain, because it is inevitable, to bereavement, because it is irreparable, and to death, because it is his destiny. If he engages in controversy of any kind, his disciplined intellect preserves him from the blundering discourtesy of better, perhaps, but less educated minds; who, like blunt weapons, tear and hack instead of cutting clean, who mistake the point in argument, waste their strength on trifles, misconceive their adversary, and leave the question more involved than they find it. He may be right or wrong in his opinion, but he is too clear-headed to be unjust; he is as simple as he is forcible, and as brief as he is decisive. Nowhere shall we find greater candour, consideration, indulgence: he throws himself into the minds of his opponents, he accounts for their mistakes. He knows the weakness of human reason as well as its strength, its province

and its limits. If he be an unbeliever, he will be too profound and large-minded to ridicule religion or to act against it; he is too wise to be a dogmatist or fanatic in his infidelity. He respects piety and devotion; he even supports institutions as venerable, beautiful, or useful, to which he does not assent; he honours the ministers of religion, and it contents him to decline its mysteries without assailing or denouncing them. He is a friend of religious toleration, and that, not only because his philosophy has taught him to look on all forms of faith with an impartial eye, but also from the gentleness and effeminacy of feeling, which is the attendant on civilization.

Not that he may not hold a religion too, in his own way, even when he is not a Christian. In that case his religion is one of imagination and sentiment; it is the embodiment of those ideas of the sublime, majestic, and beautiful, without which there can be no large philosophy. Sometimes he acknowledges the being of God, sometimes he invests an unknown principle or quality with the attributes of perfection. And this deduction of his reason, or creation of his fancy, he makes the occasion of such excellent thoughts, and the starting-point of so varied and systematic a teaching, that he even seems like a disciple of Christianity itself. From the very accuracy and steadiness of his logical powers, he is able to see what sentiments are consistent in those who hold any religious doctrine at all, and he appears to others to feel and to hold a whole circle of theological truths, which exist in his mind no otherwise than as a number of deductions.

Such are some of the lineaments of the ethical character, which the cultivated intellect will form, apart from religious principle. They are seen within the pale of the Church and without it, in holy men, and in profligate; they form the *beau-ideal* of the world; they partly assist and partly distort the development of the Catholic. They may subserve the education of a St. Francis de Sales or a Cardinal Pole; they may be the limits of the contemplation of a Shaftesbury or a Gibbon. Basil and Julian were fellow-students at the schools of Athens; and one became the Saint and Doctor of the Church, the other her scoffing and relentless foe.

NOTES

NOTES

SECTION 1: THOUGHT

Summary of three preceding discourses, and statement of present problem.

PAGE **15**. LINE 1. **Gentlemen:** observe, first, that this is discourse meant to be spoken. What effect, if any, would you expect that circumstance to have upon the style? Secondly, that this Discourse is the concluding one of four upon the same general theme, viz., the affiliations of Knowledge. Would you expect this last to be the most important? Why?

P. **15**. L. 6. **First:** Cf. Discourse V.

P. **15**. L. 10. **Next:** Cf. Discourse VI.

P. **15**. L. 13. **Form:** a term borrowed from Scholastic Philosophy. Philosophy should be the form of Knowledge, that is, that which draws it together into a unity of meaning. When we understand the relation of parts and the unity of the whole, we understand philosophically. Philosophy has *informed*, or given form to, our knowledge.

P. **16**. L. 3. **Further:** this paragraph and the one following summarize Discourse VII.

P. **16**. L. 26. **Though such profit:** a parenthetic clause packed with meaning. Work out the thought in a brief essay, contrasting *profit* and *worth* in various applications.

P. **17**. L. 3. **One portion:** that is, of the general subject of the relations of knowledge; the new phase now being introduced is the bearing of Knowledge—Culture—upon Religion. Cf. *The Idea of a University*, p. 123; where Newman says that the object of cultivating the mind is "an object as intelligible as the cultivation of virtue, while, at the same time, it is absolutely distinct from it."

P. **17**. L. 9. **Partly coöperating, etc.:** cite historical instances.

P. **17**. L. 11. **Pale:** account for, etymologically and historically.

SECTION 1: STRUCTURE

Logically, notice the division of thought; first, what has been discussed, secondly, what has yet to be treated of. *Rhetorically*, observe the close linking of paragraph to paragraph, e.g., "first," "next," "further," "such" (used pronominally with retrospective reference, a favorite connective of Newman's).

SECTION 2: THOUGHT

Introductory (further): Since the object of inquiry is how does Knowledge affect Christian Religion morally, it is asked here—before the attempt is made "to set down some portions of the outline, if we can ascertain them, of the Religion of Civilization"—what, then, are the principles of Christian morality?

P. **17**. L. 24. **Right Reason:** The basis of Natural Religion, as it is called—the gentleman's religion, as Newman makes it out to be—is Reason; the basis of Supernatural Religion is Faith, though approached by way of the reason. (See below, rhetorical note on this sentence.) Cf. Newman, *Discourses to Mixed Congregations*, p. 224 et seq. Cp. W. H. Mallock, *Is Life Worth Living*, where, speaking of the infallibility of faith, he says, "It is not a fetter only; it is a support also; and those who cling to it can venture fearlessly, as explorers, into currents of speculation that would sweep away altogether men who did but trust to their own powers of swimming," p. 310.

P. **18**. L. 24. **This is that Religion of Reason:** Note that the gentleman's is the "Religion of Reason" and that this is "simply distinct" from Catholicism.

P. **19**. L. 12. **When I speak of Revealed Truth:** Newman defines before discussing. He explains the sense in which

Revealed Truth is here considered: not its doctrinal content, what we must *believe*, but its moral content, what we must *do*. An enumeration of these principles follows.

SECTION 2: STRUCTURE

P. **17**. L. 24. **Right Reason:** because of unguarded pronominal reference, this sentence is obscure. The sense is: Right Reason, that is, Reason rightly exercised, leads the mind to the Catholic Faith; Reason plants the mind there; and Reason teaches the mind in all the mind's religious speculations to act under Faith's guidance.

P. **19**. L. 12. **And here again:** another instance of close connective.

SECTION 3: THOUGHT

What Culture does for Religion.

P. **20**. L. 29. **Opening the subject:** what does Culture contribute to Religion? Intellect supersedes sense. The run of thought is: nature, against the allurements of sense, is weak; nature plus grace, is stronger, but at times still fails; nature, plus grace, plus cultivated mind, offers, *of necessity*, a stronger front to the assaults of sense, though, *incidentally*, it may be otherwise.

P. **22**. L. 6. **Protected by disgust and abhorrence:** but these very feelings may be made the groundwork of the next attack, because they are the effect of pride, injured self-respect. The security they give is false.

P. **22**. L. 28. **A sort of homœopathic medicine:** "like cures like." Intellect, a faculty of nature, is employed against the lower nature.

SECTION 3: STRUCTURE

P. 23. L. 7. **This then:** the opening sentence of this paragraph affords our first example of what may be termed the *key* to Newman's paragraph construction viewed on its

logical side. It is just this: at the beginning of each paragraph in connected discourse, Newman generally furnishes in a topical sentence the gist of the preceding paragraph. Thus, here, "the *primâ facie* advantage of the pursuit of Knowledge" is a phrase which fulfils that function. Sometimes, too, the "*key*" is a forecast of the substance of the paragraph which it opens. Henceforward, the "key" should invariably be sought.

SECTION 4: THOUGHT

The process of thought here is from the general to the particular. Culture begets a certain fastidiousness whose value is to create loathing for certain vices as ungentlemanlike, to check, by causing delay, the commission of other sins, and to clinch resolution afterwards. This is of special use in our devitalized day, as is seen in municipal measures for recreation, etc. Result, a merely naturally good character, confusable with Christian, but certainly not Christian.

P. **25**. L. 15. **So keen a remorse, etc:** cf. Maturin, *Knowledge and Self Discipline*, p. 14.

P. **25**. L. 26. **In rude and semi-barbarous periods:** apply to North American Indian.

P. **26**. L. 24. **Honourable recreations:** write an essay on "The Philosophy of the Public Playground."

P. **28**. L. 10. **The radical difference:** Newman makes it plain that this estimable exterior is yet only a counterfeit. Cf. *infra*, p. 208, line 31, *Hence it is*, etc.

SECTION 4: STRUCTURE

The connection of paragraphs is markedly close: point out.

P. **26**. L. 12. **But, when in the advancement:** a splendidly made sentence, memorize.

P. **28**. L. 19. **The elementary principles:** notice that the concluding sentence of this section gives the "key" to the following section.

SECTION 5: THOUGHT

The basic principles of the cultured character: Culture is deterred from sin through shame and self-reproach; the religious character through fear, fear of God. Consequently, with culture, conscience becomes taste, a spurious religion because subjective. Yet it shows well, sometimes, in lowly natures, and, too, it makes much of honor.

P. **30**. L. 8. **The keeping of deed with deed:** little things and big, things lowly and high, are commanded us; a choice of these is taken by Culture conformably to some ideal of personal dignity. The plain Christian observes the law as it comes.

P. **30**. L. 16. **Fools, not sinners:** of course there is folly in sinning; Culture errs in regarding this folly as the only or chief evil of sin. Hence the popularity of such a decadent screed as that beginning, "A fool there was."

P. **31**. L. 14. **A gentleman's religion . . . is based upon honour:** in the light of this remark, and in view of the philosophy Newman expresses throughout, discuss the Honor System in schools and colleges.

SECTION 5: STRUCTURE

A particularly well-knit argument here: point out the "joints and bridges" of thought, that is, connectives and "key."

SECTION 6: THOUGHT AND STRUCTURE

This section, though in two paragraphs, is logically but one paragraph, and that largely quoted. It carries forward Newman's exposition in giving a practical example of Culture's attitude facing the supreme problems of life and death, admirably summed up at the conclusion of the section.

Special Note. An extended footnote in French in this section suggests the observation that in an English class, at all events, quotations from any foreign language should be translated

into English, as distinguished from the un-English into which they are too often done in the French class or the Latin class. For example, in the present quotation, it should be pointed out that "génie," as distinguished from "connaissances," means great natural power of intellect as distinguished from acquired knowledge; that "de l'habilité dans le métier de la guerre" is quite rendered by our "military genius," etc.

SECTION 7: THOUGHT

Specimens of the Religion of Philosophy, taken from Lord Shaftesbury. This *gentleman* attacks the doctrine of reward and punishment, ruling out the motives of fear and hope; declares that the virtue of virtue is its beauty, that taste, not conscience, is our guide, that ridicule is the test of truth and that we are our own norm.

SECTION 8: THOUGHT

Newman's conclusion really begins here, in depicting the results, in conduct, of philosophical religion. It is an indictment of Culture that it is content with setting up a fair exterior, whereas Christianity thoroughly regenerates the soul.

SECTION 8: STRUCTURE

P. 40. L. 26. **Vice lost half its evil:** etc: as a test of assimilation, write a brief essay on this saying of Burke's.

Find in the concluding paragraph of this section a sentence which may be said to express Newman's mind on this subject in a nutshell.

SECTION 9: THOUGHT

Particular points of this indictment, running on—and this is important to observe—into the next section; how Culture can never be humble—the test of Christianity. Culture saves its face, so to speak, by professing modesty and turning its

pride into self-respect. The result is a concealed self-conceit. Yet there are, in a way, admirable things it can accomplish—behold, the gentleman.

SECTION 9: STRUCTURE

P. 44. L. 21. **Humility is one, etc.:** is Newman often aphoristic?

P. 45. L. 24. **Condescension:** an admirable study of the precise meaning of words. Notice that Newman takes account of derivations: "con," Latin *cum*, with, makes this word mean to *descend with*, radically. Likewise, "participate," below, means to *take part with*.

P. 48. L. 3. **The hollow sepulchre:** has this phrase a scriptural connotation?

SECTION 10: THOUGHT

Continuity in mind, behold the gentleman: what admirable qualities he has, what admirable things he does, but, withal, in conclusion, he is really more pagan than Christian. In detail, his social relations are considered, his personal actions, especially his conduct of controversy and particularly of religious controversy. His own religion may be nil.

Final Conclusion: Far from utterly condemning the gentleman, Newman declares, and this is the most interesting thing of all to note, that everything which Culture aims at may be laudably sought upon Christian principles, and that the presence of Christian motives will remove the defects of Culture's methods and ideal.

SECTION 10: STRUCTURE

P 49. L. 4. **Hence:** the very word, indicating a conclusion, presupposes the previous argument. Accordingly, the error of divorcing this section from the Lecture as a whole.

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